Mirage: _____________ analysts and investors. __________ Contrywide ______ as primarily a maker of___________ quality mortgage loans, qualitatively different from competitors who ____________ primarily in riskier lending
(prime / reassured / engaged / held out )
Fraud: engaged in ____________ sleight of hand – appearing to provide sufficient information to__________ analysts and the purchasers of its mortgage ____________ securities (“MBS”) that Countrywide was being _______________, all while ________________ the true nature of the company’s rapidly deteriorating ________________ quality from its equity investors
(satisfy / backed /concealing / disclosure / underwriting / forthcoming )
“Supermarket" strategy: offer any product offered by any ___________ and adopt _______________ guidelines that were as________ as ever / riskier and riskier loans and "exceptions,” which failed to _____________ already wide underwriting guidelines and had a higher ___________ of default.
( underwriting / rate / competitor / meet / wide )
Was more dependent than many of its competitors on selling loans it __________ into the ______________ mortgage market
_________ to disclose that Countrywide's business model was ____________
____________ the market by falsely assuring investors that Countrywide was primarily a prime quality mortgage' lender which had avoided the ______________ of its competitors
( unsustainable / secondary / failed / misled / excesses / originated )
falsely ____________ that Countrywide "manage[d] credit risk through credit _______, underwriting, quality control and ____________ activities," and the 2005 and 2006 Forms 10-K falsely ______________ that Countrywide ______________ its continuing access to the mortgage backed securities market by "consistently producing quality mortgages.”
(policy / stated / surveillance / ensured / represented)
In one internal email, Mozilo referred to a particularly ___________ subprime product as "toxic," and in another he ___________ that the company was "flying blind," and had "no way" to predict the __________ of its heralded product, the Pay-Option ARM loan. Mozilo believed that the risk was so high and that the secondary market had so ___________ Pay-Option ARM loans that he repeatedly urged that Countrywide sell its entire portfolio of those loans
( mispriced / stated / performance / profitable )
while in __________ of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide's increasing credit risk and the risk that the poor expected performance of Countrywide-originated loans would _____________ Countrywide from continuing its business model of selling the majority of the loans it _______________ into the secondary mortgage market, ___________ over 5.1 million stock options and sold the underlying shares for total ______________ of over $139 million
(exercised / possession / originated / proceeds / prevent)
Enter an order, __________ to Section 21 (d)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2), _____________ defendants Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki from _____________ as officers or directors of any_____________that has a class of securities registered ____________ to Section 12 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781, or that is required to __________ reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780(d).
(acting / pursuant / file / issuer / pursuant / prohibiting)
Order defendants Mozilo and Sambol to _____________ all _____________ gains from their illegal _____________, together with prejudgment interest thereon.
( ill-gotten / conduct / disgorge )